The present work investigated young children's normative understanding of property rights using a novel methodology. Two-and 3-year-old children participated in situations in which an actor (1) took possession of an object for himself, and (2) attempted to throw it away. What varied was who owned the object: the actor himself, the child subject, or a third party. We found that while both 2-and 3-year-old children protested frequently when their own object was involved, only 3-year-old children protested more when a third party's object was involved than when the actor was acting on his own object. This suggests that at the latest around 3 years of age young children begin to understand the normative dimensions of property rights.
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Introduction
Possession and property structure many, if not most, of our everyday interactions with objects. Young children (and even some animals) care about physical possession, and indeed many of children's early conflicts with peers are over physical possession (Bakeman & Brownlee, 1982; Brenner & Mueller, 1982; Bronson, 1975; Dawe, 1934; Dunn & Munn, 1987; Hay, 1984; Hay & Ross, 1982; Shantz, 1987) . By around 24 months, young children can reliably identify who posseses familiar objects (Fasig, 2000) , and their appropriate use of possessive language (''My milk'', ''Mommy's sock'') suggests some nascent understanding even earlier than that (Hay, 2006; Tomasello, 1998) .
But possession and property are quite different things: while possession can be understood as a natural relation of proximity, physical control, etc., of persons to objects, property is a social, normatively structured institution (Searle, 1995; Snare, 1972) . The notion of property thus addresses not the relation of people to things, but rather the relation of people to people (their ''agreements'') with respect to things (Rose, 1985; Snare, 1972 ; for developmental aspects of this, see Kalish, 2005) . Property is a status conferred on objects by the collective assignment of some social body who agrees to ''respect'' property assignments. Regarding its logical structure, ''property'' is a cluster concept, defined by a network of constitutive rules regulating (i) under which conditions who owns what (call them ''conditions of ownership'' rules), and (ii) what implications (rights, commitments, entitlements, etc.) owning which objects carries under which conditions (call them ''implications of ownership'' rules) (Snare, 1972) . For example, buying an object, rather than renting it, is a proper condition of ownership, which then implies (entitles) that one may use it, sell it, give it to other people, destroy it, etc.
Some recent studies have begun to look at young children understanding of property as a social institution. Some studies have focused on how they infer ownership from hearing stories or seeing drawings of people acting with things (e.g., Friedman & Neary, 2008; Neary, Friedman, & Burnstein, 2009 ). These studies have focused on such things as first possession (e.g., who begins the story holding an object) or control of permission (e.g., who says whether others can use an object) as cues of ownership. Other studies have focused on children's ability to track 0010-0277/$ -see front matter Ó 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2011.06.007
